Given a set D of tuples defined on a domain Ω, we study differentially private algorithms for constructing a histogram over Ω to approximate the tuple distribution in D. Existing solutions for the problem mostly adopt a hierarchical decomposition approach, which recursively splits Ω into sub-domains and computes a noisy tuple count for each sub-domain, until all noisy counts are below a certain threshold. This approach, however, requires that we (i) impose a limit h on the recursion depth in the splitting of Ω and (ii) set the noise in each count to be proportional to h. The choice of h is a serious dilemma: a small h makes the resulting histogram too coarse-grained, while a large h leads to excessive noise in the tuple counts used in deciding whether sub-domains should be split. Furthermore, h cannot be directly tuned based on D; otherwise, the choice of h itself reveals private information and violates differential privacy.
INTRODUCTION
Releasing sensitive data while preserving privacy is a problem that has attracted considerable attention in recent years. The stateof-the-art paradigm for addressing the problem is differential privacy [16] , which requires that the data released reveals little inforPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. mation about whether any particular individual is present or absent from the data. To fulfill such a requirement, a typical approach adopted by the existing solutions is to publish a noisy version of the data in place of the original one.
In this paper, we consider a fundamental problem that is frequently encountered in differentially private data publishing: Given a set D of tuples defined over a domain Ω, we aim to decompose Ω into a set S of sub-domains and publish a noisy count of the tuples contained in each sub-domain, such that S and the noisy counts approximate the tuple distribution in D as accurately as possible. Applications of the problem include:
• Private modelling of spatial data [12, 41] often requires generating a multi-dimensional histogram of the input data.
• For differentially private data mining (e.g., k-means [48] and regression analysis [29] ), one of the general approaches is to first coarsen the input data and inject noise into it, and then use the modified data to derive mining results.
• Existing algorithms for sequence data publishing [7] require identifying frequent patterns (e.g., prefixes) in a given set D of sequences. This is equivalent to asking for a decomposition of the sequence domain Ω into a set of disjoint sub-domains, such that (i) each sub-domain includes all sequences in D containing a particular pattern, and (ii) the number of sequences included in each sub-domain is larger than a given threshold.
To address the above decomposition problem, the prior art mostly adopts a hierarchical approach, which (i) recursively splits Ω into sub-domains and computes a noisy tuple count for each of them, and (ii) stops splitting a sub-domain when its noisy count is smaller than a threshold. This approach, albeit intuitive, requires a pre-defined limit h on the maximum depth of recursion when splitting Ω. The reason is that, to ensure differential privacy, the amount of noise injected in each tuple count has to be proportional to the maximum recursion depth, and hence, h must be fixed in advance so that the algorithm can decide the correct noise amount to use.
Nevertheless, the choice of h is a serious dilemma: for the algorithm to produce fine-grained sub-domains of Ω, h cannot be small; yet, increasing h would lead to noisier tuple counts, and thus more errors in deciding whether a sub-domain should be split. As a consequence, no choice of h could result in an accurate approximation of the input data. Furthermore, we cannot tune h directly on the input dataset; otherwise, the choice of h itself reveals private information and violates differential privacy. To mitigate these issues, existing work relies on heuristics to select an appropriate value of h, and to generate fine-grained decompositions even when h is small. As we show in our experiments, however, those heuris-tics are rather ineffective when the input data follows a skewed distribution (which is often the case in practice).
Contributions. Motivated by the limitations of existing solutions, we present PrivTree, an algorithm for the decomposition problem that adopts the hierarchical approach but completely eliminates the dependency on a pre-defined h. In particular, PrivTree requires only a constant amount of noise in deciding whether a sub-domain should be split, which enables it to generate fine-grained decompositions without worrying about the recursion depth. Such a surprising improvement is obtained with a novel mechanism for differential privacy that exploits a non-trivial analysis on the Laplace noise [17] to derive an extremely tight privacy bound. Its central insight is that, in the context of hierarchical decomposition, it is possible to publish a sequence S of 0/1 values using O(1) noise, regardless of the sensitivity of S [17] . In contrast, the standard Laplace mechanism [17] requires that noise amount must be proportional to S's sensitivity.
To demonstrate the applications of PrivTree, we apply it to the private modeling of spatial data, and present a non-trivial extension to tackle sequence data, for which we adopt an advanced Markov model and utilize a sophisticated measure (instead of tuple counts) to decide whether a sub-domain should be split. We experimentally evaluate our algorithms on a variety of real data, and show that they considerably outperform the states of the art in terms of data utility.
In addition, we present an in-depth analysis on the connection between PrivTree and the support vector technique (SVT) [18, 21, 28] , a technique widely adopted for data publishing under differential privacy. We show that there exists a variant of SVT [28] that could have been used to implement PrivTree, if its privacy guarantees are as claimed in previous work [28] . Nevertheless, we prove that the SVT variant [28] does not satisfy differential privacy, which makes it inapplicable in our context.
In summary, we make the following contributions in this paper:
1. We propose PrivTree, a differentially private algorithm for hierarchical decomposition that eliminates the dependency on a pre-defined threshold of the recursion depth.
2. We present applications of PrivTree in modeling spatial and sequence data. (Sections 3 and 4) 3. We analyze the connection between PrivTree and the SVT, and point out a misclaim about the latter in [28] . (Section 5) 4. We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate the superiority of PrivTree over the states of the art. (Section 6)
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the concepts behind differential privacy [16] , and define the problem of spatial decomposition [14, 46] , which we will address with our PrivTree algorithm in Section 3.
Differential Privacy
Let D be a sensitive dataset with n tuples, and A be a data publishing algorithm that takes D as input and releases a set of information A(D). Differential privacy requires that A(D) should be insensitive to the presence or absence of any particular tuple in D, so that an adversary cannot infer much private information from A(D). More formally, differential privacy is defined based on the concept of neighboring datasets, as shown in the following. DEFINITION 2.1 (NEIGHBORING DATASETS [16] There exist several mechanisms [17, 24, 38] for achieving differential privacy, among which the most fundamental one is the Laplace mechanism. Specifically, the Laplace mechanism considers a function f that takes D as input and outputs a vector of real numbers, and it aims to release f (D) with differential privacy. To achieve this objective, it adds i.i.d. noise into each value in f (D), such that the noise η follows a Laplace distribution with the following probability density function:
We denote the above distribution as Lap(λ), and refer to λ as the scale (since the standard deviation of Lap(λ) is proportional to λ). Dwork et al. [17] prove that the Laplace mechanism achieves 
where D and D are any two neighboring datasets, and · 1 denotes the L1 norm.
Intuitively, S(f ) measures the maximum possible change in f 's output when we insert or remove one arbitrary tuple in f 's input.
An important property of differential private algorithms is that their composition also ensures differential privacy:
This lemma is particularly useful in proving that an algorithm ensures differential privacy: we can first decompose the algorithm into a few sequential components, and then analyze each component separately; after that, we can apply Lemma 2.1 to establish the overall privacy guarantee of the algorithm.
Spatial Decompositions
Let D be a set of data points in a multi-dimensional space Ω. A spatial decomposition [14, 46] of D consists of a tree-structured decomposition of Ω into its sub-domains, along with a partitioning of the data points among the leaves of the decomposition tree. For example, Figure 1 illustrates a spatial decomposition of a twodimensional dataset D that contains 12 data points. The decomposition tree has 9 nodes, namely, v1, v2, . . . , v9, each of which is associated with a sub-domain of Ω (denoted as "dom" and visualized as a black rectangle in Figure 1 ). We refer to each sub-domain as a region. The root of the tree, v1, corresponds to a region that covers the entire Ω; this region is recursively divided into four equal-size sub-regions in the lower levels of the tree, until each leaf node contains a sufficiently small number of data points.
The spatial decomposition in Figure 1 is referred to as a quadtree [14, 46] , and is widely adopted in spatial databases for efficient Figure 1 : An illustration of a spatial decomposition tree.
query processing. In particular, suppose that we are to use the quadtree to answer range count queries, i.e., queries that ask for the number of data points contained in a rectangle q. In that case, we can pre-compute, for each node v in the quadtree, the number of data points contained in v's region. Then, we can answer any range count query q with a top-down traversal from the root node of the quadtree. Specifically, at the beginning of the traversal, we initialize the query answer as ans = 0. After that, for each node v that we traverse, we examine v's region dom (v) , and differentiate four cases: After the traversal terminates, we return ans as the result. For instance, consider a range count query q that corresponds to the dashed-line rectangle in Figure 1 . To answer q, we only need to examine four nodes, namely, v1, v4, v5, v9; the other nodes are all ignored since their regions are disjoint from q. The efficiency of quadtrees results from its adaptiveness to the underlying distribution, i.e., it grows deep into the dense regions of Ω where there are a large number of data points (e.g., the region of v4 in Figure 1 ), and it ignores those regions that are sparse (e.g., the regions of v2, v3, v5). Such adaptiveness has motivated existing work [12] to utilize quadtrees for generating private synopses of spatial data. Specifically, the technique in [12] first applies a differentially private algorithm to generate a quadtree, and then employs the Laplace mechanism to inject noise into the point count of each node. The quadtree and the noisy counts can then be used to answer any range-count query q using the top-down traversal algorithm mentioned above, with two minor modifications. First, whenever we visit a node v whose region is fully contained in q, we add the noisy count associated with v (instead of the exact count) to the query answer ans. Second, if v is a leaf node whose region dom(v) partially intersects q, then we multiply the noisy count of v by
before adding it to ans, where |·| denotes the area of a region. That is, given only the noisy count of v, we estimate the number of data points in dom(v) that are contained in q, by assuming that the points follow a uniform distribution. The rationale of this approach is that, given the adaptiveness of the quadtree, each leaf node v should cover a region where the data distribution is not highly skewed; otherwise, v should contain a dense sub-region, in which case the quadtree construction algorithm should have further split v (instead of making v a leaf node). This makes it relatively accurate to adopt a uniform assumption when estimating the contribution of v to the answer of q. In Section 3, we will present a more detailed analysis of the above quadtree approach, and then use it to motivate our PrivTree algorithm. the privacy risk of a node v (see Equation (5)
an upper bound of ρ (see Equation (7)) β the fanout of the spatial decomposition tree δ the decaying factor used by PrivTree I the set of distinct items in a given set D of sequences
PRIVATE SPATIAL DECOMPOSITIONS
This section presents our solution for constructing private spatial decompositions. We first revisit the private quadtree approach (in Section 2.2) and discuss its limitations; after that, we elaborate our PrivTree algorithm, analyze its guarantees, and discuss its extensions. Table 1 shows the notations that we frequently use.
Private Quadtrees Revisited
Algorithm 1 presents a generic version of the private quadtree approach mentioned in Section 2.2. The algorithm takes as input four parameters: (i) a set D of spatial points defined over a multidimensional domain Ω, (ii) the scale λ of the Laplace noise to be used in the construction of the quadtree, (iii) the threshold θ used to decide whether a quadtree node should be split, and (iv) the threshold h on the maximum height of the decomposition tree. The output of the algorithm is a quadtree T where each node v comes with two pieces of information: the sub-domain of Ω corresponding to v (denoted as dom(v)), and a noisy version of the point count in dom(v) (denoted asĉ(v)). We define the depth of v as the hop distance between v and the root of T , and denote it as depth (v) .
The algorithm starts by creating the root note v1 of T , after which it sets dom(v1) = Ω and marks v1 as unvisited (Lines 1-2). The subsequent part of the algorithm consists of a number of iterations (Lines 3-9). In each iteration, we examine if there is an unvisited node v in T . If such v exists, we mark v as visited, and employ the Laplace mechanism to generate a noisy versionĉ(v) of the number of points contained in dom(v) (Lines 4-6). After that, we split v if the following two conditions simultaneously hold. First,ĉ(v) > θ, i.e., dom(v) is likely to contain a sufficiently large number of points. Second, the height of the tree is smaller than h, which, as we discuss shortly, ensures that the noisy counts generated by the algorithm would not violate differential privacy. If both of the above conditions are met, then we generate v's children and insert them into T as unvisited nodes (Lines 7-9); otherwise, v becomes a leaf node of T . When all of the nodes in T become visited, the algorithm terminates and returns T . Privacy and Utility Analysis. Algorithm 1 ensures ε-differential privacy if λ ≥ h/ε. To understand this, suppose that we insert an arbitrary point t into D. Then, T has only h nodes whose exact point counts are affected by the insertion of t, i.e., the h nodes whose sub-domains contain t. In addition, the point count of those nodes should change by one after t's insertion. This indicates that the sensitivity (see Definition 2.3) of all point counts in T equals h, and hence, adding i.i.d. Laplace noise of scale λ ≥ h/ε into the counts would achieve ε-differential privacy.
As we mention in Section 1, however, requiring λ ≥ h/ε makes it rather difficult for Algorithm 1 to generate high-quality quadtrees. Specifically, if we set h to a small value, the resulting quadtree T would not adapt well to the data distribution in D, due to the restriction on the tree height; meanwhile, increasing h would also increase the amount of noise in eachĉ(v), which makes Algorithm 1 more error-prone in deciding whether a node should be split, thus degrading the quality of T . In other words, any choice of h inevitably leads to inferior data utility. Furthermore, we cannot directly tune h by (i) testing the performance of Algorithm 1 on D under different settings of h, and then (ii) selecting the one that yields the best result. The reason is that such a tuning process violates differential privacy: when we change the input data from D to a neighboring dataset D , the tuning process may select a different h, in which case Algorithm 1 would use different noise scales for D and D , invalidating its privacy guarantee.
To alleviate the above issue, existing work [12, 41, 42, 48] resorts to heuristics to choose h without violating differential privacy, and to enhance the performance of Algorithm 1, e.g., by avoiding the generation of noisy counts for certain levels of the decomposition tree (so that h can be reduced), and by exploiting correlations among the noisy counts to improve their accuracy [25] . However, none of those heuristics is able to thoroughly address the limitations of Algorithm 1. As we shown in our experiments in Section 6, existing approaches tend to provide inferior data utility, especially when the input data follows a skewed distribution.
Rationale Behind Our Solution
To remedy the deficiency of Algorithm 1, we aim to eliminate the requirement that λ ≥ h/ε, and make λ a constant instead. This would not only resolve the dilemma in choosing h, but also unleash the potential of quadtrees as the tree height is no longer restricted. Towards this end, we first make a simple observation: after we finish constructing the quadtree T in Algorithm 1, we could remove all noisy counts associated with the intermediate nodes, and release only the noisy counts for the leaf nodes as well as the sub-domains of all nodes. The released tree, denoted as T , could still be used for query processing, since we can re-generate an alternative count for each intermediate node v in T by summing up the published noisy counts of the leaf nodes under v. Intuitively, T reveals less information than T does, and hence, we might use less noise in T to achieve ε-differential privacy.
However, the above intuition does not hold in general, as T and T require the same amount of noise to enforce the same privacy guarantee. 
.
In addition, for any vi
Therefore, when c(vi) ≤ θ holds for every
By Definition 2.2, this indicates that λ must be at least h/ε to ensure that T achieves ε-differential privacy. In summary, T is no better than T in terms of the amount of noise required, because of the negative result in Equations (2) and (3). In other words, in the worst case, releasing the boolean result of c(vi) + Lap(λ) > θ incurs the same privacy cost as releasing c(vi) + Lap(λ) directly. That said, if c(vi) > θ for some vi, then Equation (3) does not hold, in which case T could entail a smaller privacy cost than T does. To illustrate this, we denote the l.h.s. of Equation (3) as a function ρ of c(vi), i.e.,
and we plot ρ in Figure 2 . (Note that the y-axis of Figure 2 is in a logarithmic scale.) Observe that, when
decreases exponentially with the increase of x. This indicates that ln
due to the exponential decrease of ρ(vi). In that case, we have ln
= h/λ, which would enable us to set λ as a constant independent of h.
The above analysis leads to an interesting question: can we ensure that Equation (6) holds for any input dataset? In Section 3.3, we will give an affirmative answer to this question. The basic idea of our method is to add a bias term to each c(vi), so that
) is larger than a constant of choice. In addition, the bias term is independent of the input data, which guarantees that its usage does not leak any private information. The derivation of the bias term requires a careful analysis of ρ(x). To simplify our analysis, we devise a simple upper bound of ρ(x): 
The PrivTree Algorithm
Algorithm 2 presents our PrivTree technique for private spatial decomposition. As with Algorithm 1, PrivTree asks for a spatial dataset D, the scale λ of Laplace noise to be used, and a threshold θ for deciding whether a node should be split. However, it does not request a threshold h on the maximum tree height; instead, it requires a positive number δ, the usage of which will be clarified shortly. The output of PrivTree is a quadtree T , with the point count associated with each node removed. That is, T reveals the subdomain of each node v, but conceals all information about c(v). In Section 3.4, we will explain how we obtain the point count of each node, as well as our choices of θ and δ.
In a nutshell, PrivTree is similar to Algorithm 1 in that it also (i) generates T by recursively splitting a root node v1 whose region dom(v1) covers the whole data space Ω, and (ii) decides whether a node v should be split based on a noisy point count of v. However, the method for obtaining noisy counts marks the crucial difference between the two algorithms. Specifically, given a node v, PrivTree does not generate its noisy count by directly adding Laplace noise to c(v). Instead, PrivTree first computes a biased count b(v) = c(v) − depth(v) · δ, and checks if it is smaller than θ − δ; if it is, then PrivTree increases it to θ − δ. In other words,
After that, PrivTree produces a noisy countb
and splits v ifb(v) is larger than the given threshold θ. Notice that PrivTree does not restrict the height of T , as the decision to split any node v solely depends onb(v).
Privacy Analysis. Consider any quadtree T output by PrivTree, and any two neighboring datasets D and D , such that D is obtained by inserting a point t into D . In what follows, we show that setting λ = Θ(1/ε) is sufficient for ε-differential privacy, i.e.,
The proof for the first inequality in Equation (9) 
split v, and add its children to T ; 10 mark the children of v as unvisited;
11 return T with all point counts removed t. Note that those nodes should form a path from the root of T to a leaf. Let k be the length of the path, and vi be i-th node in the path, with v1 denoting the root of T . We have c(vi) = c (vi) + 1 and
Then, by Equation (1),
This indicates that λ ≥ 1/ε ensures the first inequality in Equation (9) . Next, we prove the second inequality in Equation (9) by analyzing ln
, which we refer to as the privacy cost of vi. The high-level idea of our proof is as follows. First, due to the way that we generate biased counts, each node vi's bias count b(vi) is at least a constant δ smaller than that of its parent vi−1, as long as b(vi) ≥ θ + 1. Based on this observation and Lemma 3.1, we show that all nodes vi with b(vi) ≥ θ + 1 incur a total privacy cost of Θ(1/ε). After that, we prove that the total privacy cost of the remaining nodes is also Θ(1/ε).
By the definition of v1, . . . , v k , we have c(vi) ≥ c(vi+1) and
Combining Equations (10) and (11), we have
where ρ(·) is as defined in Equation (5) . By Lemma 3.1 and Equation (11) ,
Therefore, if we set δ = γ · λ, where γ is a constant, then
Summing up the above analysis, we have the following theorem:
Noisy Counts and Parameterization
Generation of Noisy Counts. Recall that PrivTree outputs a quadtree with the point count for each node removed. However, if a quadtree with noisy counts is needed, we can easily obtain it by adding a postprocessing step to PrivTree. In particular, given a dataset D, we first invoke PrivTree to produce a ε 2 -differentially private quadtree T . After that, for each leaf node v of T , we publish a noisy version of v's point count using Laplace noise of scale 2/ε. It can be verified that this postprocessing step satisfies to achieve ε-differential privacy. Intuitively, the choice of δ is a balancing act between the amount of bias and the amount of noise in each biased noisy count b(v) used by PrivTree. In particular, if δ is small with respect to λ, then the bias term in eachb(v) is small, but the noise amount inb(v) would need to be large, since
increases when γ = δ/λ decreases. In contrast, if δ is large with respect to λ, then eachb(v) would have small noise but a large bias.
That said, we observe that there is a more important factor in choosing δ. To explain, consider a node v with a biased count b(v) = θ − δ. Ideally, we would like PrivTree to avoid splitting such a node v, as its point count is likely to be small. Nevertheless, if b(v) + Lap(λ) > θ, then PrivTree would split v and insert its children into the quadtree. In turn, each of v's children also has a certain probability to be split, and so on. If δ is excessively small, then each offspring of v has a relatively large splitting probability, in which case the splitting process may not converge, i.e., PrivTree may keep generating offsprings of v and does not terminate.
To address the above issue, we set δ in such a way to ensure that if b(v) = θ − δ, then in expectation, only 2 nodes would be generated from the subtree under v (including v itself). Specifically, we set δ = λ · ln β, where β denote the fanout of T , i.e., the number of children that each intermediate node in T has. (For example, β = 4 if T is a two-dimensional quadtree.) By Equation (1) The above setting of δ leads to the following corollary:
Choice of θ. Intuitively, the threshold θ serves the purpose of ensuring that each leaf node v of T contains a sufficiently large point count c(v), so that if we choose to output a noisy version of c(v), it would not overwhelmed by the Laplace noise injected. The choice of θ, however, is complicated by the fact that PrivTree adds a negative bias to the point count of a node when it decides whether or not to split the node. In particular, due to the negative bias, even θ = 0 could ensure that a node v with b(v) > θ has a sufficient large point count. Therefore, we use θ = 0 in our implementation of PrivTree, and we observe that it leads to reasonably good results in our experiments.
Extensions
Although we have presented PrivTree in the context of spatial decomposition, we note that it could be extended in several different aspects for other applications. First, the decomposition tree used by PrivTree does not have to be a quadtree, but can be any other tree structure instead. For example, suppose that we are given a multi-dimensional dataset D containing both numeric and categorical attributes, and that each categorical attribute has a taxonomy. Then, we can still apply PrivTree on D to generate a private synopsis of D, by splitting each numeric dimension of D according to a binary tree and each categorical dimension based on its taxonomy.
Second, when PrivTree decides whether or not a node v should be split, the decision does not have to be based on the count of tuples contained in dom(v), but can also be based on any other score function μ(v) that is monotonic, i.e., μ(v) ≤ μ(u) whenever v is a child node of another node u. The rationale is that, as long as μ is monotonic, we can add a bias to the score of each node v to ensure that it is at least a constant smaller that the score of v's parent. Then, we can apply Lemma 3.1 to show that PrivTree guarantees differential privacy, given that λ is properly set based on the sensitivity of the score function μ. In Section 4, we will apply this idea to extend PrivTree for private modeling of sequence data.
Finally, although the privacy analysis of PrivTree (in Section 3.3) assumes that the presence or absence of a tuple t only affects one leaf node and its ancestors, it can be extended to the case when multiples leaf nodes and their ancestors are impacted. In particular, if at most x leaf nodes can be affected, then we can apply PrivTree with the noise scale λ enlarged x times. The intuition is that each affected leaf node, along its ancestors, incurs one unit of privacy cost, which in turn requires one unit of noise to mitigate; as such, when there are x affected leaf nodes, we need x units of noise for sufficient privacy protection.
PRIVATE MARKOV MODELS
This section presents an extension of PrivTree for constructing Markov models on sequence data. We first introduce the basic concepts of sequences and Markov models in Section 4.1. After that, we elaborate our PrivTree extension in Section 4.2, and compare it with existing solutions in Section 4.3. 
Sequence Data and Markov Models
Markov models are a type of stochastic models commonly used to characterize sequence data. They assume the Markov property [44] , i.e., a symbol x in a sequence s is decided by a few symbols that immediately proceeds x in s, but not any others. A Markov model over D is often represented as prediction suffix tree (PST) [3, 44] , where each node v is associated with a predictor string dom (v) The intuition here is that (i) each node v in a PST provides a way to predict the "next symbol" in a sequence based on a "predicate" dom(v), and (ii) when we split v, each child node would have a longer "predicate" that provides a more specific predication.
A PST T can be used to support a wide range of queries, such as estimating the number of times that a query string sq appears in the sequences in D. Specifically, given sq = x1x2 . . . x l , we first inspect the root node v1's prediction histogram hist(v1), and then initialize a temporary answer ans = hist(v1) [x1] . After that, we examine xi (i ∈ [2, l]) in ascending order of i. For each xi, we consider the length-(i − 1) prefix of sq, i.e., s * i = x1x2 . . . xi−1. We identify the node v in T whose predictor string is the longest suffix of s * i . Then, we compute the sum of the counts in v's prediction histogram hist(v), referred to as the magnitude of the histogram and denoted as hist(v) 1. After that, we set
i.e., we multiple ans by the probability that the "next symbol" equals xi, as predicted by hist(v). When all xi (i ∈ [1, l] ) are examined, we return ans as the query answer. For example, consider a query sequence sq = AB on the PST in Figure 3 . We first visit the root node v1, and initialize ans = hist(v1)[A] = 6. After that, we consider the length-1 prefix of sq, i.e., s * 2 = A. We identify v3 as the node whose predictor string is the longest suffix of s * 2 , and we set ans = ans ·
hist(v 3 ) 1 = 3. Finally, we return ans = 3 as the answer.
In addition to the aforementioned query type, we can also utilize a PST T to generate a synthetic sequence dataset, by sampling sequences from T one by one. Specifically, to generate a sequence, we start from an initial sequence s0 = $ and insert symbols into s0 iteratively. In the i-th iteration (i ≥ 1), we inspect the sequence si−1, and identify the node v in T whose predictor string is the longest suffix of si−1. Then, we sample a symbol xi from the symbol distribution represented by hist(v), i.e.,
. After that, we insert xi to the end of si−1, and denote the resulting sequence as si. If xi happens to be &, then we return si as the result.
Extension of PrivTree
To construct a PST T on a sequence dataset D, we can start from a root node v1 with a predictor string dom(v1) = ∅, and then recursively split v1. This motivates us to adopt PrivTree for the generation of differentially private PSTs. However, we can no longer use a node v's noisy count c(v) to decide whether v should be split, since c(v) is undefined on a PST. Instead, as discussed in Section 3.5, we can redefine c(v) as a score function that measures the suitability of v for splitting. In the non-private setting, existing work [44] Figure 3 for an example.)
Suppose that we are to adopt the above conditions into PrivTree.
Condition C1 can be straightforwardly applied, since it only depends on dom(v) and does not rely on D, i.e., it does not leak private information. In contrast, conditions C2 and C3 cannot be directly adopted since the counts in hist(v) depend on D. To address this issue, we aim to design a score function c(·) for PrivTree with the following two properties:
P1. c(·) is monotonic, i.e., c(v) ≤ c(u) for any node v and its parent u. This, as discussed in Section 3.5, is required to ensure that PrivTree satisfies differential privacy.
P2. If a node v's prediction histogram has a small magnitude or a small entropy, then c(v) tends to be small. This is motivated by conditions C2 and C3 mentioned above.
Our construction of c(·) is based on the following observation: if a prediction histogram has a small entropy, it often has one symbol count that dominates the others, because a small entropy implies that the distribution of symbols in the histogram is skewed. (v4 in Figure 3 shows an example.) Motivated by this, we define c(v) as
i
.e., c(v) equals the magnitude of hist(v) minus the largest count in hist(v). The intuition is that if the magnitude of hist(v) is small, then c(v) must be small, regardless of the largest count in hist(v); on the other hand, if the entropy of hist(v) is small, then the largest count in hist(v) tends to be close to the magnitude of hist(v) (since the count often dominates all other counts in hist(v)), which results in a small c(v) as well. Thus, c(v) fulfills property P2. The following lemma show that c(v) also satisfies property P1. LEMMA 4.1. c(·) is a monotonic function.
In summary, we can construct a private PST on a sequence dataset D using PrivTree (i.e., Algorithm 2), with three minor changes. First, in Line 1 of Algorithm 2, T is a PST with a fanout |I|+1 (instead of a quadtree), and v1 is a PST node with a predictor string dom(v1) = ∅ and a prediction histogram hist(v1). Second, in Line 5, c(v) is as defined in Equation (13) . Third, in Line 11, we return T after removing the biased scoreb(v) and the prediction histogram hist(v) of each node v.
After we obtained the PST T (without prediction histograms) from the modified PrivTree, we can postprocess T to recover the prediction histograms. Specifically, for each leaf node v in T , we derive the prediction histogram hist(v) from D, and then compute a noisy version of hist(v), denoted as hist(v), by adding Laplace noise into each histogram count. After that, for any non-leaf node v , we construct a noisy prediction hist(v ), such that for any symbol x ∈ I ∪ {&},
Finally, if any noisy histogram in T has a negative count, we reset the count to zero. This is to ensure that each histogram represents a distribution of symbols.
Privacy Analysis and Parameterization.
To analyze the privacy guarantee of the modified PrivTree, we first introduce an assumption that is also adopted in prior work [6] on sequence data publication under differential privacy: we assume that the length of each sequence in D, when taking into account & but not $, is at most l , where l is a known constant. To explain why this assumption is needed, consider that we insert an infinite sequence s into D to obtain a neighboring dataset D . In that case, the insertion of s incurs unbounded changes in the histogram counts of the PST, which makes it impossible to achieve differential privacy. In general, if l is unknown, we may choose an appropriate l and truncate any sequences s that is excessively long 2 Given the above assumption, we prove the privacy guarantee of the modified PrivTree as follows. In addition, we prove that the postprocessing of PrivTree's output (i.e., adding Laplace noise to the histogram counts of the leaf nodes) also achieves ε-differential privacy. Finally, we clarify how we set θ and divide the privacy budget ε between PrivTree and its postprocessing step. First, we set θ = 0, following our analysis in Section 3.4. Second, we set the noise scale in PrivTree and its postprocessing step, such that PrivTree achieves -differential privacy. To explain, recall that in PrivTree, we inject Laplace noise into each node v's score c(v), which equals the sum of β − 1 counts in v's prediction histogram hist(v) (i.e., all counts except the largest one). Meanwhile, in the postprocessing step, we add Laplace noise to each count y in the prediction histograms of T 's leaf nodes. Intuitively, c(v) is roughly β − 1 times more resilient to noise than y. Therefore, we set the privacy budget for the postprocessing step to be β − 1 times the budget for PrivTree, so as to balance the relative accuracy of c(v) and y after noise injection.
Comparison with Previous Work
There exist two differentially private methods [6, 7] for modeling sequence data, and they both utilize hierarchical decompositions for model construction. However, they considerably differ from PrivTree in three aspects. First, they model sequences based on their prefixes [7] or n-grams [6] , while PrivTree is based on a PST representation of the variable length Markov chain model [44] . Second, their algorithms for hierarchical decompositions are similar in spirit to Algorithm 1, due to which they also require a predefined threshold h on the maximum height of the decomposition tree. Consequently, they suffer from similar deficiencies to those of Algorithm 1, i.e., they cannot generate accurate models because of the dependency on h. Third, when constructing a decomposition tree, the methods in [6, 7] decide whether a node be split based only on a count associated with the node, whereas PrivTree adopts a more advanced strategy that takes into account three conditions commonly considered in the non-private setting. The above differences make PrivTree an effective approach for modeling sequence data, as we demonstrate in our experiments in Section 6.
CONNECTIONS TO SVT
In this section, we investigate the connection between PrivTree and the sparse vector techniques (SVTs) [18, 21, 28] , which are a type of differentially private algorithms widely adopted in the literature. They take as input a sequence of queries and a threshold θ, and output either a set of queries whose results are likely to be larger than θ [18, 28] , or a noisy version of the answers for such a query set [21] . Intuitively, SVTs are similar in spirit to PrivTree since they both aim to identify some elements in a set (e.g., a node set or a query set) with "scores" above a given threshold. Motivated by this, in the following, we examine whether SVTs can be adopted for the hierarchical decomposition problem. Among the three existing variants of SVTs [18, 21, 28 ] that satisfy ε-differential privacy 3 , we will focus on a variant dubbed the binary SVT, as it is most relevant to our problem. Interested readers are referred to the technical report of this paper for discussions on the other two variants.
Algorithm 3 presents a generic version of the binary SVT. Its input includes (i) a dataset D, (ii) a sequence Q = {q1, q2, . . .} of queries such that each qi has sensitivity 1, (iii) a threshold θ, and (iv) a noise scale λ. Its output is a sequence of binary variables {o1, o2, . . .}, such that oi = 1 indicates that the result of qi is larger than θ, and oi = 0 indicates otherwise. The algorithm is fairly simple. It first computes a noisy thresholdθ = θ + Lap(λ), and then, for each query qi in the sequence, it generates a noisy query answerqi(D) using Laplace noise of scale λ (Line 1-3) . If qi(D) > θ, then algorithm outputs oi = 1; otherwise, the algorithm outputs oi = 0 (Line 4-7). Previous work [28] makes the following claim about the privacy assurance of the algorithm:
In other words, the noise scale required by the algorithm is Θ( 1 ε ) and independent of the number of queries.
If Claim 1 holds, Algorithm 3 could yield highly competitive solutions for the problems that we consider. For example, consider the spatial decomposition problem studied in Section 3. Given a threshold θ and a set D of spatial points in a multi-dimensional space Ω, we first initialize (i) a quadtree T containing only a root node v1 with dom(v1) = Ω, and (ii) a query sequence Q = {c(v1)}, i.e., Q contains only one query that asks the number of points in dom(v1) (we will dynamically append queries to Q during the construction of the quadtree). After the initialization, we invoke the binary SVT to inspect each query in Q one by one; if the binary SVT outputs 1 for a query c(v), then we split the node v in T , and append a query c(v ) to the end of Q for each child node v of v. When all queries in Q are inspected, we return the quadtree T obtained. By Claim 1, T ensures ε-differential privacy, as long as the binary SVT uses Laplace noise of scale λ ≥ , which indicates that the solution based on the binary SVT is more favorable.
Unfortunately, we show that Claim 1 does not hold: in the worst case, Algorithm 3 requires λ = Ω( k ε ) to achieve ε-differential privacy, where k denotes the number of queries. 3 There exist other variants of SVT that satisfy a relaxed version of ε-differential privacy [23] . We do not consider those variants. . Lemma 5.1 invalidates all solutions based on the binary SVT, including those in previous work [9, 28, 34] . In concurrent work [11] , Chen and Machanavajjhala present a similar analysis on the binary SVT, and also come to the conclusion that it is not differentially private. In the full version of this paper 4 , we discuss the other two variants of SVT [18, 21] , and show that one of them [21] also violates differential privacy, while the other [18] does not yield a competitive solution for our problem (even after we improve it with an optimization that leads to better data utility).
EXPERIMENTS
This section evaluates PrivTree against the states of the art on differentially private modelling of spatial and sequence data.
Experiments on Spatial Data
Datasets. We make use of four real spatial datasets shown in Table 2 : road [12, 41] , where each point represents the latitude and longitude of a road junction in the states of Washington and New Mexico; Gowalla [41, 48] , which contains check-in locations shared by users on a location-based social networking website; NYC 5 and Beijing 6 , which are 4-dimensional datasets that record the pickup and drop-off locations of NYC and Beijing taxis, respectively. Figure 4 visualizes the points in road and gowalla, as well as the pickup locations in NYC and Beijing. Observe that the data distribution in road (resp. NYC) is more skewed than that in Gowalla (resp. Beijing).
Methods. We compare PrivTree against five state-of-the-art methods: UG [41, 42, 48] , AG [41] , Hierarchy [42] , DAWA [30] , and Privelet * [50] . UG partitions the data domain into m d grid cells of equal size, and releases a noisy count for each cell, with m = (nε/10) 2/(d+2) [48] . AG is an improved version of UG that is specifically designed for two-dimensional data. It first employs a coarsened version of UG to produce a set of grid cells; after that, for each cell whose noisy count is above a threshold, AG further splits it into smaller cells and releases their noisy counts. Hierarchy utilizes a multi-level decomposition tree to generate spatial histograms, with the tree height and fanout heuristically chosen to minimize the mean squared error in answering range count queries. DAWA requires as input a workload of range count queries, and it employs the matrix mechanism [31] to generate a histogram that is optimized for the given workload. Privelet * publishes multidimensional datasets by utilizing the Haar wavelet transformation to reduce the errors of range count queries.
DAWA and Privelet * both require that the input data should have a discrete domain. Following [30] , we discretize the domain of each dataset into a uniform grid with 2 20 cells before feeding it to DAWA and Privelet * . The other parameters of each method (e.g., the height and fanout of the decomposition tree, and the grid granularity) are set as suggested in the original papers. For PrivTree, we set its fanout to 4 (resp. 16) for two-dimensional (resp. fourdimensional) datasets, which is standard for quadtrees.
We adopt the implementations of DAWA and Privelet * provided by their respective authors, and we implement all other methods in C++. All experiments are conducted on a windows/linux machine with a 2.4GHz CPU and 16GB main memory. Tasks. We apply each method to create private synopses of every dataset, and we evaluate the quality of each decomposition by the accuracy of its answers to range count queries. In particular, we construct three query sets on each dataset: small, medium, and large, each of which contains 10, 000 randomly generated range count queries. Each query in the small, medium, and large set has a region that cover [0.01%, 0.1%), [0.1%, 1%), and [1%, 10%) of the data domain, respectively. Following prior work [12, 41] , we measure accuracy of an answerq(D) to a query q by its relative error, defined as
where Δ is a smoothing factor set to 0.1% of the dataset cardinality n [41, 50] . We repeat each experiment 100 times, and report the average relative error of each method for each query set. For DAWA (which is query-dependent), we allow it to generate a synopsis for each query set separately, based on a sample set of 500 queries.
Results. Figure 5 illustrates the average relative error of each method on each dataset as a function of the privacy budget ε. On road, PrivTree significantly outperforms UG, AG, Hierarchy, and Privelet * , regardless of the query set used and the value of ε. In particular, on the large query set, the average relative error of PrivTree is at most 1 4 (resp. 1 10 ) of the error of AG (resp. UG and Hierarchy). This demonstrates the effectiveness of PrivTree in approximating the distribution of the input data. Meanwhile, AG is superior to UG and Hierarchy in all cases, which is consistent with the results in previous work [41] . DAWA is the only method that comes close to PrivTree, but its relative error is never smaller than that of PrivTree, and is 2 to 3 times higher than the latter for the small and medium query sets on road (resp. small query set on Gowalla) when ε ≥ 0.8. Furthermore, we note that DAWA is given a sample query set in advance to optimize its query performance, whereas PrivTree is not given such an advantage.
On Gowalla, PrivTree still consistently achieves the best results, but the performance gaps between PrivTree and the other methods are reduced. The reason is that the data distribution in Gowalla is less skewed than that of road (see Figure 4) , which makes Gowalla easier to dealt with for all methods. DAWA incurs relatively small errors in all cases, but is noticeably inferior to PrivTree on the small and medium query sets.
On NYC and Beijing, we omit AG and Hierarchy since (i) AG is only applicable on two-dimensional data, and (ii) when applied on a four-dimensional dataset, Hierarchy produces a decomposition tree with at least 2.18 billion leaf nodes [42] , which cannot fit in the main memory of our machine. As shown in Figures 5g-5l , PrivTree consistently outperforms all other methods by a large margin on the highly skewed NYC, because its tree construction mechanism enables it to effectively adapt to the skewness of the data, by growing the tree tall (resp. short) in the dense (resp. sparse) regions of the data. On the other hand, on the less skewed Beijing, the accuracies of UG and DAWA are considerably improved. Nevertheless, PrivTree still incurs smaller query errors in all settings. One may notice that the error of DAWA on NYC only decreases around 2 times when ε increases from 0.05 to 1.6. We find that it is caused by a "private partitioning" step of DAWA [30] , as well as the discretization of data domain Ω that it requires.
In summary, PrivTree provides better data utility than all baselines, especially when the input dataset follows a skewed distribution. This makes PrivTree a more favorable approach for releasing spatial data under differential privacy.
Experiments on Sequence Data
Datasets. We use two real sequence datasets: mooc 7 and msnbc [1, 6] . mooc contains 80, 362 learners' behavior sequences on a MOOC platform, and the behaviors are divided into seven categories: working on assignments, watching videos, accessing other course objects, accessing the course wiki, accessing the course forum, navigating to other part of course, and closing the web page. msnbc consists of 989, 818 sequences of URL categories, each of which corresponds to a user's browsing history during a 24-hour period on msnbc.com. Table 3 shows the key statistics of mooc and msnbc. Note that the total number |I| of symbols in mooc (resp. msnbc) is not excessively large. Otherwise (e.g., when |I| > 1000), the domain of the sequence data would be extremely 7 https://www.kddcup2015.com/ sparse, in which case it is enormously difficult to publish useful information under differential privacy.
Tasks. We consider two analytical tasks on each sequence dataset D. The first task is to identify the top-k frequent strings in D, i.e., the k strings that appear the largest number of times in the sequences in D. This task is an important primitive in sequence data mining [20] , and is also considered in existing work [6] on sequence data publishing. Following previous work [6] , we measure the precision of the top-k strings returned by differentially private algorithm, i.e.,
where K(D) is the exact set of top-k frequent strings in D, and A(D) is the set returned by algorithm A. The second task is to approximate the distribution of sequence lengths in D. In particular, we apply PrivTree and other existing methods to generate synthetic sequence data from D. Then, we compare the distribution of sequence lengths in the synthetic data with that in D, and we measure their total variation distance [13] , i.e., half of the L1 distance between the two probability distributions. For each task, we repeat each experiment 100 times and report the average measurements.
Methods.
For the task of top-k frequent string mining, we compare PrivTree against two differentially private techniques: N-gram [6] and EM [38] . In particular, N-gram is the state-of-the-art solution for sequence data publishing, and it is based on a variable-length ngram model. N-gram requires a pre-defined threshold nmax on the maximum length of n-grams; we set nmax = 5, as suggested in [6] . Meanwhile, EM is a standard application of the exponential mechanism [38] in our context. It first initializes a set R that contains |I| string of length 1, each of which consists of a unique symbol in I. After that, it invokes the exponential mechanism k times. In each invocation, it selects the most frequent string r from R with differential privacy, and then replaces r in R with |I| strings, each of which is obtained by adding a symbol to the end of r. The k strings obtained are then returned as the result. For the task of approximating sequence length distributions, we omit EM since it is inapplicable.
Note that PrivTree, N-gram, and EM all require that the maximum sequence length in the input data is bounded by a constant l that is not excessively large (see Section 4.2 for a discussion on the necessity of l ). Following previous work [6] , we set l to be roughly the 95% quantile of the sequence lengths in the input data, i.e., only around 5% sequences are truncated (see Table 3 ). To illustrate the effects of truncation, we also include in our experiments a baseline approach dubbed Truncate. This approach directly answers all queries on the truncated dataset, without any privacy assurance.
Results. Figure 6 shows the precision of each method (for topk string mining) as a function of the privacy budget ε. The precision of Truncate remains unchanged for all ε, since it does not enforce differential privacy. Among the differentially private methods, PrivTree consistently outperforms N-gram and EM, in most cases by a large margin. Furthermore, in Figure 6d an even higher precision than Truncate when ε ≥ 0.8. The reason is that the Markov model adopted by PrivTree is able to recover some information that is lost due to the truncation of sequences. For example, suppose that the string aa appears in 5 sequences in a dataset D and, in each appearance, it is immediately followed by a symbol b. Assume that one of those 5 sequences (denoted as s) is truncated, and its suffix aab becomes aa after the truncation. In that case, the Markov model can be used able to accurately recover the truncated symbol of s, because, based on the truncated data, it would predict that the "next symbol" after aa is always b. Intuitively, such recovering of information is more effective when the amount of noise in the Markov model is small, which explains why PrivTree outperforms Truncate only when ε is large. In contrast, N-gram never outperforms Truncate, and its precision is lower than that of PrivTree by more than 10% in most settings. In addition, EM yields unattractive precision in almost all cases. Its accuracy degrades with the increases of k, since a larger k requires it to inject more noise into the selection procession of top-k frequent strings.
In the last set of experiments, we evaluate the accuracy of the sequence length distribution in the synthetic sequence data generated by each method. Figure 7 illustrates the total variation distance of each sequence length distribution. Observe that PrivTree incurs a small error comparable to that of Truncate, especially when ε ≥ 0.2. In contrast, N-gram entails an enormous error in all cases. Based on the results in Figures 6 and 7 , we conclude that PrivTree is a more preferable solution than N-gram to modeling sequential data under ε-differential privacy. the-art solutions [6, 12, 30, 41, 42, 48, 50] for publishing spatial and sequence data under differential privacy. Besides those solutions, there are a few other methods for private modeling of spatial and sequence data. In particular, Xiao et al.
ADDITIONAL RELATED WORK
[51] present a spatial decomposition algorithm based on the k-d tree [4] . It first imposes a uniform grid over the data domain, and then construct a private k-d tree over the cells in the grid. This method, however, is shown to be inferior to the UG and AG methods tested in our experiments, in terms of data utility [41] . Chen et al. [7] consider the publication of sequence data under differential privacy, and propose an algorithm that releases a prefix tree of sequences to support count queries and frequent string mining. Nevertheless, subsequent work by Chen et al. [6] shows that the prefix-based method is considerably outperformed by the N-gram approach in our experiment. In addition, there is a long line of research on processing aggregate queries in a differentially private manner. Specifically, Barak et al. [2] investigate the publication of marginals (i.e., projections of a dataset on subsets of its dimensions), and propose a solution based on the Fourier transform. Ding et al. [15] publish multiple data cubes with both privacy and consistency guarantees. The matrix mechanism of Li and Miklau [32, 33] and follow-up approaches [22, 30, 52, 53] take into account a query workload, and aim to release a version of the data that maximizes the overall accuracy of the workload. DAWA [30] is the most advanced method among these approaches, but as shown in our experiments, it is outperformed by PrivTree in terms of the relative errors of range count queries on spatial data.
Moreover, there exists extensive work that addresses numerous other tasks under differential privacy, such as regressions [5, 27, 40, 47, 55, 57] , clusterings [48] , decision trees [19] , recommendation systems [37] , time-series data analysis [43] , combinatorial optimizations [49] , frequent itemset mining [35] , and graph queries [10, 26, 36, 56] . Finally, recent research has also studied the adoption of differential privacy in various systems [8, 39, 45] .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we study the problem of hierarchical decomposition under differential privacy, and address the central dilemma of choosing the maximum height h of the decomposition tree. We show that the constraint on h can be removed by introducing a carefully controlled bias in deciding when a node should be split. Based on this result, we propose PrivTree, a general approach for hierarchical decomposition on private data, and we showcase its applications on spatial and sequence data release. Our experimental results demonstrate that PrivTree significantly outperforms the states of the art in terms of data utility. For future work, we plan to extend the idea behind PrivTree to other problems that are based on a lattice-model instead of a tree-model, such as frequent itemset mining.
For convenience, we let α = , and define a function f of α as follows:
Observe that α ∈ (0, 1/2] whenever x ≥ θ + 1. Therefore, we can prove the lemma by showing that f (α) ≤ 0 for all α ∈ (0, 1/2]. For this purpose, we first compute the second derivative of f with respect to α:
Given that e 1/λ − 1 > 0 and e
Therefore, max α∈(0,1/2] f (α) ≤ 0, which proves the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The theorem directly follows from the privacy analysis in Section 3.3.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let V be the set of all possible nodes in a quadtree built on D. We divide the nodes in V into three subsets: (i) the set V1 of nodes that appear as non-leaf nodes in T * , (ii) the set V2 of the nodes that appear as leaves in T * , and (iii) the set V3 of the nodes that do not appear in T * . Let g(S) be the expected number of nodes in a set S that appear in T . Then, we have
Therefore, the lemma can be proved by showing g(V3) ≤ |T * |. Observe that each node in V3 must be the descendant of a node in V2, i.e., a node that appears as a leaf in T * . Therefore, we can divide the nodes in V3 into |V2| subsets, such that all nodes in the same subset are descendants of the same node in V2. Consider any such subset S that corresponds to a node v ∈ V2. Given that v appears as a leaf in T * , we have c(v) ≤ θ. In addition, since
By Equation (8) Therefore, v and v have the same probability ps to be split. Given δ = λ · ln β, we have
Assume that v appears in T . Then, given that v is split with 1 2β
probability, each child of v has 1 2β
probability to appear in T . Therefore, in expectation, the number of v's children that appear in T should equal β · ) i probability to appear in T . Hence, the expected number of nodes in S that appear in T is
Since each S uniquely corresponds to a node in V2, we have
Therefore, the lemma is proved.
Proof of Corollary 1. The corollary follows from Theorem 3.1 when γ = ln β.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let u and v be two nodes in T , such that u is the parent of v.
holds for every symbol x ∈ I ∪ {&}. Let xv (resp. xu) be the symbol that has the largest count in hist(v) (resp. hist(u)). We have
Therefore, c(·) is monotonic. In the following, we will prove that for any i ∈ [1, l] and any output T of the modified PrivTree,
where Pr[Di → T ] denotes the probability that PrivTree outputs T given Di. This would prove the theorem because, given that
Observe that Di can be obtained by appending a symbol xi to the end of the sequence si−1 in Di−1. Therefore, when we change the input data from Di−1 to Di, the only changes in the PST are the histogram counts that xi contributes to. Observe that if xi contributes to the prediction histogram hist(v) of a node v, then dom(v) must be a suffix of si−1, and the only possible change in hist(v) is that hist (v) [xi] would be increased by one. Then, by the definition of the PST, all of those nodes v should form a path from the root of the PST to a leaf. In addition, by Equation (13), the score c(v) of each of those nodes v is changed by at most one. In that case, we can prove Equation (14) by reusing the analysis in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
To explain, recall that the correctness of Theorem 3.1 only replies on two conditions. First, the score c(v) of each node v is monotonic. Second, when we change the input data, all of the nodes affected should form a path from the root of the decomposition tree to a leaf, and the score of each of those nodes should change by at most one. Notice that all three conditions are satisfied when we change the input of the modified PrivTree from Di−1 to Di. Combining this with the fact that the modified PrivTree uses a noise scale that is l times that of Algorithm 2, it can be verified that Equation (14) holds. Therefore, the theorem is proved. Observe that D1 is a neighboring dataset of D2, while D2 is a neighboring dataset of D3. Let qa (resp. q b ) be a query that asks for the number of a (resp. b) in a dataset. Let Q be a sequence of k queries, such that first k/2 queries are all qa, and the remaining k/2 queries are all q b .
Suppose that we invoke Algorithm 3 on D1, D2, D3, respectively, with Q, a noise scale λ, and a threshold θ = 1. Let E be the event that Algorithm 3 outputs 1 for the first k/2 queries in Q, and 0 for the remaining k/2 queries. In addition, let Pr[D → E] denote the probability that E occurs when the input dataset is D. If Algorithm 3 satisfies ε-differential privacy, then In what follows, we prove the lemma by showing that Equation (15) does not hold when λ ≤ k/4ε. Recall that Algorithm 3 generates a noisy thresholdθ, and outputs 1 for a query q only when its noisy answerq(D) is larger than θ. Therefore, Therefore,
> e 2ε when λ ≤ k/4ε, which proves the lemma.
B. ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate the computation efficiency of PrivTree, and the impact of β (i.e., tree fanout) on the accuracy of PrivTree. Table B shows the processing time of PrivTree on each dataset (averaged over 100 runs), with ε varying from 0.05 to 1.6. The running time of PrivTree on road and msnbc are larger than that on the other datasets, since road and msnbc are larger in size than the others. In addition, the computation cost of PrivTree increases with ε. To understand this, recall that when PrivTree decides whether or not to split a node v, it first subtracts a bias term depth(v) · δ from the score of v, and then injects noise into the biased score, after which it splits v if the noisy score is larger than the threshold θ. As δ is inversely proportional to ε (see Corollary 1), the bias term increases when ε decreases, in which case the noisy score of v is less likely to be larger than θ. Therefore, when ε is small, PrivTree has lower probabilities to split nodes, which leads to a small running time.
Previously, in Section 6.1, we evaluate the query accuracy of PrivTree on spatial data with its fanout β set to 2 d , where d is the dataset dimensionality. In that case, whenever PrivTree splits (v) . Figure 2 illustrates the results of the same experiments when β varies. In particular, when we set β = 2 i with i < d, PrivTree would split the dimensions of each node in a round robin fashion, with i dimensions being bisected each time. Observe that, in general, the query error of PrivTree slightly increases when β decreases. This is mainly due to the bias term depth(v)·δ that PrivTree subtracts from the score c(v) of each node v, when it decides whether v should be split. Specifically, a decreased β increases the height of PrivTree's decomposition tree, in which case the nodes towards the leaf level of the tree would be given a larger bias term. In turn, the increased bias term renders it more difficult for PrivTree to correctly decide whether a node should be split, thus degrading the quality of PrivTree's output.
Nevertheless, on a few settings on NYC and Beijing, β = 2 d/2 entails smaller errors than β = 2 d . The reason is that, when β is large, any incorrect decisions made by PrivTree in node splitting would have a more pronounced negative effect, e.g., a quadtree node with a small count would be divided into a larger number of child nodes, each of which would have an even smaller count that is likely to be overwhelmed by the noise subsequently added. The increased number of noise-dominated nodes would then lead to less accurate query answers, which explains why β = 2 d/2 sometimes outperforms β = 2 d . That said, the overall result in Figure 8 indicates that β = 2 d is still a preferable choice for PrivTree.
